

## Message Text

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 STATE 246296

15

ORIGIN SP-02

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 H-02 SAM-01 SSO-00 /018 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:LHYDLE

APPROVED BY H - KEMPTON B. JENKINS

----- 006838

O 162213Z OCT 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 246296

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (MCCLOSKEY)

SUBJECT: MCCLOSKEY - DRAFT SPEECH

1. FIRST DRAFT OF YOUR OCTOBER 22 SPEECH (DRAFTED BY  
SPEECHWRITER HYDLE) FOLLOWS:

WORKING TITLE: FOREIGN AFFAIRS: WHERE WE STARTED, WHERE

WE ARE, AND WHERE WE HOPE TO BE

INTRODUCTION

2. MRS. VANCE, LADIES, I'M DELIGHTED TO BE HERE. I ONLY

REGRET THAT CY VANCE ISN'T. I'VE OFTEN THOUGHT OF HIM IN

RECENT MONTHS WHILE WORKING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE

CONGRESS ON CYPRUS, GREECE, AND TURKEY, AND RELATED ISSUES.

HE SAVED A PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS FROM

THIS AGONY BACK IN 1967 BY TALKING THE PRINCIPALS IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 246296

THE AREA OUT OF GOING TO WAR. WE MISS HIM.

2. THE SITUATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IS OF  
COURSE ONLY ONE AMONG MANY FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS  
FACING THE FORD ADMINISTRATION, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND  
THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CONGRESS. TODAY  
I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF THESE AREAS OF OUR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS. BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE OF TIME I  
WILL NOT TRY TO COVER THEM ALL, AND I APOLOGIZE IN ADVANCE  
IF I LEAVE OUT YOUR FAVORITE ISSUE. THE TITLE OF MY TALK  
IS "FOREIGN AFFAIRS: WHERE WE STARTED, WHERE WE ARE,  
AND WHERE WE HOPE TO BE." THE TIME PERIOD BEGINS IN THE  
POST-WAR, COLD-WAR ERA, AND STRETCHES THROUGH THE PRESENT  
INTO THE EARLY YEARS OF OUR THIRD CENTURY AS AN INDE-  
PENDENT NATION. (JOE SISCO, OUR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MADE A SPEECH EARLIER THIS YEAR  
IN WHICH HE LOOKED FORWARD ALL THE WAY TO THE YEAR 2000,  
BUT MY AMBITION TODAY IS LESS SWEEPING -- BESIDES, I  
DON'T WANT TO DIFFER WITH HIM, OR WORSE STILL, TO  
UPSTAGE HIM). TOWARD THE END OF MY REMARKS, I WOULD  
LIKE TO TALK ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL -- THE  
COMMON CITIZEN, EVERYMAN, OR AS WE SAY THESE DAYS,  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 246296

EVERY PERSON -- IN THE FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF  
FOREIGN POLICY. FINALLY, WITH SOME TREPIDATION, I PLAN  
TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT ON WHICH I'M SUPPOSED TO BE THE  
STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESIDENT EXPERT -- THE ROLE OF THE

CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY.

3. WHERE WE STARTED (UNDERScoreD)

AS YOU ALL RECALL, IN THE POST-WAR ERA THE US ASSUMED THE BURDEN OF WORLD LEADERSHIP BECAUSE OURS WAS THE SOLE MAJOR COUNTRY TO EMERGE RELATIVELY UNSCATHED FROM WORLD WAR II, AND BECAUSE WE WANTED TO HELP THE RAVAGED WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES RECOVER THEIR PROSPERITY AND ESCAPE DOMINATION BY AGGRESSIVE TOTALITARIAN COMMUNISM LED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THIS POLICY WAS WIDELY SUPPORTED IN THE UNITED STATES -- THE BIPARTISANSHIP IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES REFLECTED THE CONSENSUS IN THE COUNTRY -- BECAUSE, I THINK, IT OFFERED THE PROSPECT OF DEFENDING BOTH OUR MATERIAL INTERESTS AND OUR MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES. OUR CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE LEITMOTIF OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. WE SAW OTHER COUNTRIES AS ALLIES OF OURS AND DEPENDENT ON OUR HELP,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 STATE 246296

OR "SATELLITES" OF THE SOVIET UNION; AND OUR ASSISTANCE TO NONALIGNED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WAS USUALLY JUSTIFIED AS FORESTALLING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD "GO COMMUNIST". THE GENERAL STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WAS TENSE AND HOSTILE, BROKEN SOMETIMES BY PERIODS OF RELATIVE CORDIALITY, OCCASIONALLY BY CRISES WHICH CARRIED THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR -- WHICH WE CERTAINLY FEARED, BUT FOR WHICH WE FELT BETTER PREPARED THAN THE SOVIETS

BECAUSE OF OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY. THE  
UNITED NATIONS WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH EAST-WEST ISSUES;  
WE HELD A SOLID MAJORITY BUT THE SOVIETS USED THEIR VETO.  
MEANWHILE, THE WORLD ECONOMY GREW FAIRLY STEADILY UNDER  
A REGIME OF RELATIVELY FREE TRADE AND CAPITAL MOVEMENT,  
GOVERNED BY FIXED CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES PEGGED TO OUR  
DOLLAR. ONLY A SMALL SHARE OF OUR OWN WELL BALANCED AND  
STEADILY GROWING ECONOMY WAS DEPENDENT UPON WORLD TRADE,  
AND WE HAD NO SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES  
WE NEEDED.

4. THIS PERIOD OF BIPOLAR CONFRONTATION AND AMERICAN  
ASCENDANCY SEEMS REMARKABLY SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD  
IN RETROSPECT. BUT IN THE 1960S IT WAS ALREADY BEGINNING  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 05 STATE 246296

TO CHANGE. OUR INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA ABSORBED AN  
INCREASING SHARE OF OUR ATTENTION, AND DEMONSTRATED THE  
LIMITS OF OUR POWER AND OUR WISDOM. THE COMMUNIST BLOC  
WAS SHATTERED BY THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT. THE SOVIET  
UNION ATTAINED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY WITH THE UNITED  
STATES. OUR POST-WAR ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN,  
GROWING ECONOMICALLY FASTER THAN WE AND, IN EUROPE,  
UNITING THEIR ECONOMIES, BECAME INCREASINGLY RESTIVE UNDER  
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, THOUGH THEY CONTINUED TO BE EQUALLY  
RESTIVE AT THE PROSPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT MAKE  
A DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION AT THEIR EXPENSE, OR CEASE

TO EXERCISE THAT LEADERSHIP. THE NUMBER OF NEWLY  
INDEPENDENT "NON-ALIGNED" OR "THIRD WORLD" COUNTRIES  
SEEMED TO MULTIPLY EVEN FASTER THAN THEIR POPULATIONS.  
AND LATIN AMERICA BEGAN TO IDENTIFY LESS WITH NORTH  
AMERICA AND MORE WITH THE THIRD WORLD, SO THE BALANCE  
IN THE UNITED NATIONS TILTED FROM WEST TO SOUTH. SOME  
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES LIKE INDIA, BRAZIL, NIGERIA, AND  
IRAN, BECAME REGIONAL POWERS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION POSED THE PROSPECT THAT NUCLEAR  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 06 STATE 246296

WAR COULD BE FOUGHT IN A CONTEXT OUTSIDE THE AMERICAN-  
SOVIET RIVALRY. MEANWHILE, THE POST-WAR WORLD FINANCIAL  
AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM CAME UNDER STRAIN DUE TO INTER-  
NATIONAL PAYMENT IMBALANCES, RESOURCE SHORTAGES, THE  
UNHAPPY SYNCHRONIZATION OF INFLATION AND RECESSION WITHIN  
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND OF THE BUSINESS CYCLES OF THE  
MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS. AWARENESS OF THE ENVIRON-  
MENTAL COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND OF THE PROJECTED  
IMPACT OF POPULATION GROWTH HAS LED TO QUESTIONING OF  
WHETHER GROWTH IS DESIRABLE EVEN IF IT IS STILL POSSIBLE.

5. WHERE WE ARE (UNDERScoreD)

IN DISCUSSING WHERE WE ARE TODAY IN CERTAIN AREAS OF OUR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, I WILL CONCENTRATE ON CERTAIN AREAS IN  
WHICH WE HAVE PURSUED CONSCIOUS POLICIES DESIGNED TO

ADAPT AMERICA'S POSTURE AND PROTECT AMERICA'S INTERESTS

AND VALUES IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHANGES FROM THE COLD-

WAR ERA WHICH I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED.

6. DESPITE THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY AND THE MANY

CENTERS AND KINDS OF POWER THAT HAVE DEVELOPED IN

RECENT YEARS, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 07 STATE 246296

REMAINS OUR MOST IMPORTANT ONE, BECAUSE OUR TWO COUNTRIES

SHARE THE DUBIOUS DISTINCTION OF BEING ABLE TO BLOW AWAY

EACH OTHER AND MUCH OF WORLD CIVILIZATION AS WE KNOW IT.

OUR POLICY HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF

NUCLEAR WAR WITH THE SOVIETS THROUGH ARMS CONTROL AGREE-

MENTS AND BY ESTABLISHING A WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN

OUR GOVERNMENTS AND SOCIETIES WHICH WOULD CREATE VESTED

INTERESTS ON BOTH SIDES TOWARD COOPERATION AND AGAINST

CONFRONTATION.

7. WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE SOVIETS ON MEASURES TO LIMIT

THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PREVENT THE ACCI-

DENTAL OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

TO 150 KILOTONS, LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ANTI-BALLISTIC

MISSILE SITES TO ONE FOR EACH COUNTRY, AND THE NUMBER OF

OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC LAUNCHING VEHICLES HELD BY EITHER

SIDE, TO BAN THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUTER

SPACE OR ANTARCTICA, TO OUTLAW CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL

WARFARE, AND TO BAN ANY FORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE

WHICH WOULD CAUSE WIDESPREAD, SERIOUS, OR LONG-LASTING

DAMAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT. PRESIDENT FORD AND GENERAL

SECRETARY BREZHNEV AGREED IN PRINCIPLE LAST YEAR AT  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 08 STATE 246296

VLADIVOSTOK TO EQUAL AGGREGATE LIMITS IN OFFENSIVE

VEHICLES, THUS PLACING A CEILING ON THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. SECRETARY KISSINGER POINTED OUT

RECENTLY THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN

SPELLED OUT ABOUT 90 PERCENT, ALTHOUGH SOME TOUGH ISSUES

REMAIN BEFORE THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY

CAN SIGN THE AGREEMENT.

8. TO BE SURE, THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ALREADY

REACHED HAVE BEEN EASIER THAN THOSE THAT REMAIN TO BE

CONCLUDED -- THAT'S WHY THEY WERE CONCLUDED FIRST. IT

IS RELATIVELY EASY TO BAN THE EMPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS WHERE

THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN, OR THEIR USE IN A WAY THEY CANNOT

YET BE USED, OR TO IMPOSE A CEILING WHICH HAS NOT YET

BEEN EXCEEDED. IT IS MUCH HARDER TO AGREE TO REDUCE ARMS.

FOR EXAMPLE, OUR AGREEMENT OF

LAST YEAR TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS TO 150 KILOTONS

AFTER MARCH 31, 1976, DEPENDS ON AN AGREEMENT TO CONTROL

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY DO

NOT PERMIT EITHER SIDE TO ADVANCE ITS WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

THE PROCEDURES TO VERIFY THIS ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 09 STATE 246296

WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT EVEN IF BOTH OF US WERE DEALING WITH OPEN SOCIETIES, AND THEY ARE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT WHEN DEALING WITH A COUNTRY WITH A PASSION FOR SECRECY. VERIFICATION IS ALSO A PROBLEM IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, AND I CANNOT RESIST INTERJECTING HERE THAT US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES ARE VITAL IN ANY VERIFICATION EFFORT; THE BETTER THESE CAPABILITIES ARE, THE MORE CERTAIN WE CAN BE WHETHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE BEING OBSERVED.

9. I ALSO MENTIONED THE WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIETS. IN SUMMIT MEETINGS IN RECENT YEARS WE HAVE CONCLUDED A LARGE ARRAY OF AGREEMENTS ON EXCHANGES IN SUCH AREAS AS AGRICULTURE, HEALTH, AND THE ENVIRONMENT. THE LEVEL OF THESE ACTIVITIES FALLS CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF THAT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER MAJOR COUNTRIES, BUT BY THE SAME TOKEN IT HAS GREATLY EXPANDED THE AREA OF CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO SOCIETIES. WE MUST CONTINUE TO PROTECT OUR STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY, AND WE HAVE TO IMPOSE SOME CONSTRAINTS ON OUR OWN ECONOMY IN DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEM FROM TAKING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 10 STATE 246296

ADVANTAGE OF OUR RELATIVELY FREER, PROFIT-ORIENTED ONE.



10. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE A TIME WHEN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WILL APPROACH THE SCALE OF THOSE WITH OTHER FREE-MARKET ECONOMIES, THERE ARE REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL DEALINGS; A CURRENT EXAMPLE IS THE POSSIBLE DEAL IN WHICH WE WOULD SELL THEM GRAIN IN RELATIVELY FIXED AMOUNTS OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS, AND BUY OIL FROM THEM -- THEY RECENTLY BECAME THE WORLD'S LARGEST PRODUCER -- UNDER SIMILAR CONDITIONS. ASIDE FROM THE PURELY ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS, WE HOPE, AS I INDICATED ABOVE, THAT THE WEB OF EXCHANGES AND RELATIONSHIPS BEING ESTABLISHED BETWEEN US WILL CREATE A VESTED INTEREST ON BOTH SIDES IN CONTINUED COOPERATION AND AGAINST POINTLESS CONFRONTATIONS.

11. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION REMAIN IDEOLOGICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL RIVALS. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT CONTINUED SOVIET READINESS TO EXPLOIT WESTERN WEAKNESS AND ERROR TO ADVANCE THEIR INTERESTS WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 11 STATE 246296

IT IS MORE DIFFICULT FOR US, WITH OUR FREE AND POWERFUL PUBLIC OPINION, THAN FOR THE SOVIETS, TO MAINTAIN THE COMPLEX MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL ATTITUDES REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT A POLICY WHICH COMBINES MILITARY READINESS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION WITH SELECTIVE COLLABORATION

AND COOPERATION, AND WHICH APPEARS AT TIMES TO IMPOSE A  
CONFLICT BETWEEN OUR MATERIAL INTERESTS AND OUR MORAL  
VALUES. WE DO NOT CLAIM THAT THE CRITICS OF DETENTE ARE  
MERELY NOSTALGIC COLD WARRIORS, ALTHOUGH WE REJECT THE  
CONCEPT THAT WE SHOULD OPPOSE ANY AGREEMENT THAT BENEFITS  
THE SOVIETS AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT HONORABLE AND INTELLI-  
GENT PEOPLE CAN DISAGREE IN THE UNITED STATES -- AS  
PRESUMABLY THEY DO IN THE SOVIET UNION -- ON HOW HARD  
ONE SHOULD BARGAIN WITH THE OTHER SIDE, AND IN WHAT  
AREAS ONE MIGHT SEEK OR FIND CONCESSIONS. BUT DESPITE  
DISAGREEMENTS OVER TACTICS, I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS BROAD  
AGREEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE NEED TO LIMIT AND  
REDUCE STRATEGIC ARMS, AND CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE  
SUPERPOWERS, AND TO FIND WAYS TO COLLABORATE WHEN IT IS  
IN OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

12. OUR EFFORT, IN COLLABORATION WITH OUR WESTERN  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 12 STATE 246296

EUROPEAN ALLIES AND FRIENDS, TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN EUROPE, IS CLOSELY  
RELATED TO THE POLICIES I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED IN OUR  
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN JULY,  
35 NATIONS AGREED TO A DECLARATION ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE WHICH WAS INTENDED TO REDUCE  
TENSIONS AND TO INCREASE AND IMPROVE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN  
CONTACTS. DURING THE TOUGH NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING

AGREEMENT ON THE DECLARATION, OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS TOOK

THE LEAD FOR THE WEST IN INSISTING ON INCREASED EASTERN

CONCESSIONS IN THE SO-CALLED "BASKET THREE" OF THE NEGO-

TIATIONS, THOSE DEALING WITH HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. AT

LEAST THE EAST IS COMMITTED IN PRINCIPLE TO IMPLEMENTING

BASKET THREE, AND THERE WILL BE A FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCE IN

TWO YEARS AT WHICH THEIR PERFORMANCE WILL BE COMPARED

WITH THEIR PROMISES. NATURALLY WE DO NOT WANT TO CLAIM

TOO MUCH FOR THE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY BEFORE SEEING

WHETHER IT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED PROPERLY, BUT WE BELIEVE

IT WAS A WORTHWHILE EXERCISE IN ESTABLISHING PRINCIPLES

FOR THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 13 STATE 246296

EUROPE.

13. THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF NATO AND WARSAW

PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED IN OUR

MINDS WITH THE MOVES TO RELAX TENSIONS AND INCREASE CON-

TACTS WHICH I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED. NEGOTIATIONS ON FORCE

REDUCTIONS HAVE NOT MADE MUCH PROGRESS, BECAUSE IT IS

DIFFICULT TO VERIFY WHAT FORCES THE OTHER SIDE HAS, AND

TO AGREE ON THE WEIGHT TO BE ATTACHED TO VARIOUS ATTRI-

BUTES OF THE FORCES ON EITHER SIDE. AS I INDICATED

EARLIER, IT IS INHERENTLY MORE DIFFICULT TO AGREE TO

EXISTING FORCES ANYWHERE THAN IT IS TO AGREE NOT TO PUT

THEM WHERE THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN OR TO IMPOSE A CEILING

THAT NEITHER SIDE HAS YET REACHED. SINCE OUR ALLIES ARE INVOLVED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE US HAS A DIPLOMATIC TASK EVEN MORE COMPLEX THAN IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS; WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH PRESSURE FROM WITHIN THE US TO REDUCE OUR TROOPS OVERSEAS AND TO GET OUR ALLIES TO BEAR MORE OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN IN EUROPE; PRESSURE FROM OUR ALLIES TO MAINTAIN STRONG SECURITY FORCES IN EUROPE AND TO REDUCE THEM ONLY IN RETURN FOR COMPARABLE WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS, AND OF COURSE PRESSURE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 14 STATE 246296

FROM THE EAST TO REDUCE OUR FORCES IN A WAY THAT WE REGARD AS UNBALANCED AND DANGEROUS TO THE SECURITY OF THE WEST IN EUROPE.

14. THE BREAKUP OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC HAS PERMITTED THE US TO DEAL MORE FLEXIBLY WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE FOREIGN POLICIES THEY PURSUE, AND NOWHERE HAS THIS BEEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. AS I SPEAK, SECRETARY KISSINGER IS IN PEKING FOR HIS EIGHTH VISIT -- THE LAST TIME I SAW HIM IN HIS OFFICE, HE WAS PRACTICING PING PONG, AND I GAVE HIM A ROLL OF TUMS FOR THE MAO TAI. THE OPENING OF OUR RELATIONS HAS BEEN USEFUL IN ITSELF IN ENDING YEARS OF HOSTILITY AFTER THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN CHINA. IT HAS INCREASED OUR DIPLOMATIC FLEXIBILITY IN EAST ASIA, AND HAS ENJOYED IMPRESSIVELY BROAD SUPPORT

FROM THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. IN THE SPIRIT  
OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE THE UNITED STATES HAS REDUCED  
ITS FORCES ON TAIWAN AND ELSEWHERE IN EAST ASIA AS THE  
TENSION IN THE AREA SUBSIDES, BUT THE DIFFERING VIEWS  
OF THE PRC AND THE US ON TAIWAN STILL CONSTITUTE AN  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 15 STATE 246296

OBSTACLE TO THE COMPLETE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. WE  
HOPE THAT WITHOUT WAITING FOR FULL NORMALIZATION IT WILL  
BE POSSIBLE TO EXPAND FURTHER OUR EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS,  
BUT I WOULD NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE  
CHINESE ARE LIKELY TO BE VERY HELPFUL TO US ON OTHER  
PROBLEMS ON WHICH THEY MIGHT HAVE SOME INFLUENCE, SUCH AS  
THE KOREAN PENINSULA, AND OUR RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD  
WORLD.

15. OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AMONG THE INDUSTRIAL-  
IZED DEMOCRACIES OF NORTH AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE, AND  
JAPAN HAVE ADJUSTED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CHANGES IN THE  
PERCEIVED COMMUNIST THREAT, AND THEIR OWN INCREASED  
ECONOMIC STRENGTH AND DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENT FOREIGN  
POLICIES. THE NINE NATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
ARE CONTINUING TO INTEGRATE THEIR ECONOMIES, WHICH  
COMBINED ARE SECOND IN SIZE ONLY TO OUR OWN, AND INCREAS-  
INGLY THEY ARE COORDINATING THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES.  
JAPAN, KNOWN FOR "LOW POSTURE" DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-  
WAR ERA, COULD BE SAID TO HAVE ADOPTED A "MIDDLE POSTURE",

CONTINUING TO LACK MILITARY CAPABILITY AND CAUTIOUSLY

MOVING INDEPENDENTLY IN HER RELATIONS WITH THIRD  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 16 STATE 246296

COUNTRIES. IN NATO WE ARE PLACING GREATER EMPHASIS ON  
THE STANDARDIZATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE AND EQUIPMENT  
IN ORDER TO GET MORE DEFENSE FOR THE MONEY, AND WE AND  
THE JAPANESE ARE TRYING TO CONSULT MORE CLOSELY ON  
DEFENSE MATTERS. THE RECENT WORLD INFLATION AND RECES-  
SION AND RESOURCE SHORTAGES HAVE FORCED THE INDUSTRIAL-  
IZED COUNTRIES TO COLLABORATE MORE CLOSELY IN VARIOUS  
MULTILATERAL FORA TO MAKE SURE THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES TO  
PROTECT INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL ECONOMIES DO NOT WORK AGAINST  
THE RETURN OF STEADY ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE WORLD  
ECONOMY AND ITS TRADE WHICH EVERYONE WANTS. THE ECON-  
OMIC SUMMIT SCHEDULED FOR EUROPE IN NOVEMBER IS DESIGNED  
TO IMPROVE OUR COLLABORATION IN THESE MATTERS, AND IN  
DEALING WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ON THE ISSUES OF  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN WHICH OUR  
INTERESTS ARE SIMILAR.

16. WE HAVE TAKEN OTHER STEPS TO ASSURE THAT OUR RELA-  
TIONSHIP WITH ANOTHER GROUP OF OLD FRIENDS, THE LATIN  
AMERICAN COUNTRIES, DOES NOT DEGENERATE AS IT CHANGES.  
WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS HAVE RESENTED OUR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 17 STATE 246296

SHEER SIZE AND SOME OF OUR POLICIES IN THE PAST, THAT MANY  
OF THEM FEEL INCREASING KINSHIP WITH THE THIRD WORLD, AND  
THAT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE DIFFERENT FROM EACH  
OTHER IN THEIR INTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THEIR FOREIGN  
POLICIES. WE HAVE BEGUN WHAT, FOR LACK OF A BETTER NAME,  
IS CALLED THE "NEW DIALOGUE" WITH LATIN AMERICAN  
COUNTRIES. THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING  
OLD ISSUES WHICH HAVE DIVIDED THE LATINS AND OURSELVES;  
WE HAVE TAKEN THE CUBAN SANCTIONS OUT OF THE POLITICS OF  
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, AND CONTINUE TO  
NEGOTIATE WITH PANAMA ON A CANAL TREATY. SOME HEADWAY  
HAS ALSO BEEN MADE IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR DIALOGUE;  
THERE IS LESS POMPOUS RHETORIC ABOUT INTER-AMERICAN  
BROTHERHOOD, AND ALSO SOMEWHAT LESS INFLATED RHETORIC  
ABOUT THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA. BY  
THE SAME TOKEN, THERE IS MORE SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT  
THE CONCRETE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN  
AMERICA. WE FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE WITH THE LANGUAGE OF  
PRAGMATIC PROBLEM-SOLVING, AND ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT LED TO  
AGREEMENT ON SUCH TANGLED AND EMOTIONAL ISSUES AS  
SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SEAS OR RULES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTI-  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 18 STATE 246296

NATIONAL ENTERPRISES, WE SEE NO REAL ALTERNATIVE WAY TO  
PROCEED.

17. THE WORLD IS FULL OF AREAS OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL REGIONAL CONFLICTS -- THE MIDDLE EAST, THE KOREAN PENINSULA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND CYPRUS ARE EXAMPLES. THESE ARE POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS WHEN ALLIES OF THE SUPER-POWERS ARE INVOLVED, OR WHEN ONE OR MORE OF THE LOCAL POWERS HAS A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. AMERICAN POLICY IN THESE AREAS DEPENDS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES; WHAT RELATIONSHIPS WE HAVE IN THE AREA, WHAT INTEREST WE HAVE IN THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT, AND WHETHER OTHER POWERS OR REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS CAN OR SHOULD BE INVOLVED. YOU ALL KNOW QUITE WELL THE DIRECT ROLE THE UNITED STATES IS PLAYING IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND I WOULD ARGUE STRONGLY THAT AMERICAN INTERESTS THERE ARE BEST SERVED BY MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE, AND BY A SITUATION IN WHICH WE HAVE FRIENDS AMONG THE ARABS AS WELL AS THE ISRAELIS. TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS PROPOSED AN INFORMAL MEETING OF THE FOUR SIGNATORIES OF THE ARMISTICE IN 1953, AND

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 19 STATE 246296

MEANWHILE WE INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. IN CYPRUS WE ARE LEAVING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES' LEADERSHIP UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, BUT DEALING DIRECTLY WITH THE GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE A



SETTLEMENT AND TO MINIMIZE AND IF POSSIBLE UNDO THE  
DAMAGE DONE TO THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO BY THE ACTIONS  
OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS WHO HAVE INVOLVED THEMSELVES IN THE  
SITUATION. IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, WE BELIEVE THAT THE  
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON NAMIBIA MUST BE OBEYED, BUT  
WE RELY PRIMARILY ON THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO  
FIND A SOLUTION TO THE OTHER PROBLEMS OF THAT AREA WITHOUT  
RESORT TO WAR.

18. FINALLY, IN ORDER TO INHIBIT THE SPREAD OF THE  
EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY REQUIRED TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PUSHING VERY STRONGLY,  
WITH SOME SUCCESS, FOR INCREASED ADHERENCE TO THE NUCLEAR  
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND WITH SOMEWHAT LESS SUCCESS,  
FOR GREATER COLLABORATION AMONG THE WORLD'S PRINCIPAL  
NUCLEAR EXPORTERS TO ASSURE THAT COMPETITION TO PROVIDE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 20 STATE 246296

NUCLEAR ENERGY CAPABILITY DOES NOT LEAD TO A BREAKDOWN OF  
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST WEAPONS PRODUCTION.

19. THE GROWTH OF MANY DIFFERENT CENTERS OF POWER AROUND  
THE WORLD HAS AN ECONOMIC AS WELL AS A MILITARY BASIS,  
AND IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT IN A WORLD OF INCREASINGLY  
SCARCE RESOURCES, GROUPS OF NATIONS WHO ARE ABLE TO  
CONTROL SUPPLY OF VITAL COMMODITIES CAN CONVERT THEIR  
ECONOMIC POWER INTO POLITICAL CLOUD. AT THE SAME TIME,  
THERE IS INCREASING DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE WORLD'S

LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES THAT THE POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL  
ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH HAS WORKED RATHER WELL FOR THE  
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, HAS PERMITTED THEM TO DROP  
FURTHER BEHIND US. WHILE THE PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD  
WORLD ARE BY NO MEANS ALL EXTERNALLY IMPOSED, IT IS  
CLEAR THAT A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RICH AND POOR WAS NOT  
DOING THE WORLD ANY GOOD. AT A SERIES OF INTERNATIONAL  
CONFERENCES -- ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN STOCKHOLM IN  
1972, ON POPULATION IN BUCHAREST AND ON FOOD IN ROME  
IN 1974, ON WOMEN THIS JULY IN MEXICO CITY, AND ON THE  
LAW OF THE SEA IN CARACAS AND GENEVA LAST YEAR AND THIS,  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 21 STATE 246296

THE RICH AND POOR NATIONS OF THE WORLD HAVE BEEN TRYING  
TO COME TO GRIPS WITH PRESSING PROBLEMS. UNFORTUNATELY  
THE CONFRONTATIONISM RHETORIC AT THESE MEETINGS HAS  
TENDED TO OBSCURE THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT. BUT AT THE  
UN SPECIAL SESSION THIS SEPTEMBER IN NEW YORK, A REAL  
BREAKTHROUGH WAS MADE IN AGREEMENT AMONG THE DEVELOPED  
AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS ON SOME OF THE PROGRAMMATIC  
GOALS WE SHARE, AND THE FORA IN WHICH THEY WILL BE  
ADDRESSED. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE FLAVOR WILL LAST,  
BUT WE WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO FOCUS THESE DISCUSSIONS ON  
SOLVING THE REAL PROBLEMS OR ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN  
A WAY BENEFICIAL TO THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNITY.

20. WHERE WE HOPE TO BE (UNDERScoreD)

I TURN NOW TO WHERE WE HOPE TO BE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. I CAN OFFER NO CLAIRVOYANT FORECASTS OR UTOPIAN SPECULATIONS, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT IF THE WORLD MAKES THE RIGHT MOVES IN THE COMING YEARS, IT CAN BE A BETTER PLACE FOR ALL OF US.

21. MOST IMPORTANTLY WE -- AND I CAN ONLY SPEAK FOR THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 22 STATE 246296

FORD ADMINISTRATION, BUT I FEEL SURE THAT THE VIEWS I AM OFFERING DO CORRESPOND BROADLY TO THOSE HELD BY OTHER AMERICANS -- HOPE TO BE LIVING IN AN ERA IN WHICH THERE IS LESS DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR WHICH COULD DESTROY CIVILIZATION, IN WHICH IDEOLOGICAL RIVALRIES AMONG NATIONS ARE CHanneLED INTO CONTESTS TO PROVIDE THE BEST LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE THEY GOVERN, RATHER THAN MILITARY CLASHES; IN WHICH OTHER DIFFERENCES AMONG NATIONS ARE SETTLED BY COMPROMISE, CONCILIATION, MEDIATION, AND ARBITRATION RATHER THAN RESORT TO FORCE. WE HOPE THAT ARMS RACES, WHETHER STRATEGIC OR REGIONAL, WILL HAVE REACHED THEIR PEAK AND BEGUN TO DECLINE SO THAT THE PEOPLES CONCERNED FEEL MORE SECURE THAN TODAY AT A LESS COSTLY LEVEL OF ARMS SPENDING.

22. WE HOPE THAT THE WORLD WILL HAVE RESUMED A STEADY ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE, BUT THAT THE GROWTH WILL BE MANAGED SO AS TO CONSERVE THE WORLD'S SCARCE RESOURCES

AND TO CONTROL POLLUTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

AND TO SPREAD THE BENEFITS OF PROSPERITY TO NATIONS AND

CLASSES WHO DO NOT NOW ENJOY THEM.

23. WE HOPE THAT SECURITY AND PROSPERITY WILL MAKE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 23 STATE 246296

POSSIBLE CLOSER AND FRIENDLIER CONTACTS AMONG ALL THE  
GOVERNMENTS AND THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, ENHANCE THE  
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN OUR COUNTRY AND OTHERS  
WHERE THEY ARE ALREADY RESPECTED, AND ENCOURAGE THE  
SPREAD OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO NATIONS, CLASSES, AND RACES  
WHO DO NOT NOW FULLY ENJOY THEIR BLESSINGS.

24. THE ROLE OF "EVERYPERSON" (UNDERSCORED)

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC CAN PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN MAKING AND  
CARRYING OUT THE KIND OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WHICH  
WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE BETTER WORLD I HAVE DESCRIBED.  
IF THERE WAS EVER ANY DOUBT THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC  
HAS INFLUENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY, EVENTS OF THE PAST  
FEW YEARS HAVE SHOWN OTHERWISE. THE MOST VIVID RECENT  
EXAMPLE IS THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S TURN AWAY FROM OUR PRE-  
VIOUS SUPPORT FOR NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS IN INDO-  
CHINA THIS PAST SPRING. WHATEVER THE REASONS FOR THIS  
SHIFT, AND WHATEVER HISTORIANS MAY SAY ABOUT ITS RIGHT-  
NESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSED FURTHER  
US INVOLVEMENT THERE, AND THAT THE CONGRESS WAS RESPONDING  
TO THEIR WISHES IN PREVENTING THE ADMINISTRATION FROM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 24 STATE 246296

EFFECTIVELY COMING TO THE ASSISTANCE OF THOSE REGIMES.

25. GENERALLY SPEAKING, UNDER OUR SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, THE COMMON CITIZEN'S INSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY CAN BE PLAYED MOST EFFECTIVELY BY VOTING FOR A PRESIDENT, SENATORS, AND A CONGRESSMAN WHO SHARE HIS OR HER FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS. I WOULD SAY THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT HAS MORE INFLUENCE OVER FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS THAN HE HAS OVER DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. I THINK THE AMERICAN PUBLIC UNDERSTANDS THIS, AND THAT FOR EXAMPLE IN 1972 THEY STRONGLY SUPPORTED PRESIDENT NIXON MORE BECAUSE OF A FEELING OF CONFIDENCE IN HIS HANDLING OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAN BECAUSE OF ANY STRONG ATTACHMENT TO HIS VIEWS ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INCREASING DESIRE OF THE CONGRESS TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS SHOULD LEAD THE AMERICAN VOTER INCREASINGLY TO LOOK AT CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES' RECORD AND VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES.

26. IN BETWEEN ELECTIONS, THE PUBLIC'S VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY ARE MADE KNOWN TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 25 STATE 246296

IN A LESS SYSTEMATIC WAY. MAIL TO THE PRESIDENT OR THE CONGRESS DOES CARRY SOME WEIGHT; SO DO THE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED VIEWS OF ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS; SO DO PUBLIC OPINION POLLS, WHETHER TAKEN BY CONGRESSMEN FOR THEIR OWN BENEFIT OR BY INDEPENDENT POLLSTERS. THE DIVISION BETWEEN A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS AND A REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE, WHILE IT DOES MAKE FOR A STALEMATE IN SOME AREAS AND MAY BE UNCOMFORTABLE AND CONTENTIOUS FOR THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED, MAY WELL GIVE THE COMMON CITIZEN SOME LEVERAGE IN LEANING TOWARD ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER ON PARTICULAR ISSUES.

27. BUT IN ORDER TO EXERCISE ONE'S INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES EFFECTIVELY, IN AN AGE WHEN OUR FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES ARE MORE LIMITED AND MORE COMPLEX THAN PERHAPS EVER BEFORE IN OUR HISTORY AS A NATION, WE NEED A MORE SOPHISTICATED TYPE AND LEVEL OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION THAN WE HAVE EVER HAD BEFORE. I RECOGNIZE I'M PREACHING TO THE CHOIR AT THIS POINT, BUT WE NEED A HIGHER AND MORE SUSTAINED LEVEL OF PUBLIC ATTENTION TO AND INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAN WE HAVE HISTORICALLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 26 STATE 246296

MAINTAINED. IT WILL NO LONGER DO TO HAVE LONG PERIODS OF INDIFFERENCE PUNCTUATED BY SUDDEN INCREASES IN TIMES OF WAR OR CRISIS. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE PUBLIC NEEDS TO BECOME MORE TOLERANT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMBIGUOUS

AND COMPLEX AGE IN WHICH WE LIVE -- WHY WE MUST MAINTAIN  
MILITARY STRENGTH YET SEEK TO CONTAIN THE ARMS RACE;  
DEFEND OUR FREEDOM, YET EASE TENSIONS WITH IDEOLOGICAL  
ADVERSARIES; PRESERVE OUR ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND INDE-  
PENDENCE, YET RECOGNIZE THE FACT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC  
INTERDEPENDENCE.

28. OUR AMERICAN PUBLIC MUST REALIZE THAT EFFECTIVE  
FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE STABLE AND REASONABLY PREDICTABLE  
TO BOTH OUR FRIENDS AND OUR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES.  
ADJUSTMENTS TO EVEN THE MOST CLEARLY PERCEIVED NEEDS MUST  
BE CARRIED OUT IN AN ORDERLY FASHION LEST THEY CREATE  
UNNECESSARY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TURBULENCE IN WORLD  
AFFAIRS.

29. MORE AND BETTER PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THESE FACTS  
OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE HOPEFULLY WILL LEAD TO A MORE  
STABLE PUBLIC MOOD, LESS EUPHORIC WHEN THINGS GO WELL  
AND LESS DESPONDENT WHEN THEY TURN SOUR; LESS PRE-  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 27 STATE 246296

OCCUPIED WITH INDIVIDUAL PERSONALITIES AND TACTICS, AND  
MORE WITH UNDERLYING INTERESTS AND FORCES. A PROPERLY  
INTERESTED AND INFORMED AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL ALSO RESIST  
ATTEMPTS BY PRESSURE GROUPS REPRESENTING NARROW INTERESTS  
AND IDEOLOGIES TO DOMINATE POLICY DECISIONS ON ISSUES IN  
WHICH A BROADER NATIONAL INTEREST IS INVOLVED.

30. I MIGHT SAY THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS MADE A

MAJOR EFFORT, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF A VERY MODEST PUBLIC AFFAIRS BUDGET, TO IMPROVE ITS COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. AS YOU KNOW, SECRETARY KISSINGER AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTING INVITATIONS FROM MAJOR CITIES AROUND THE COUNTRY TO TALK ABOUT FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MEET LESS FORMALLY WITH LOCAL GROUPS AND WITH THE LOCAL PRESS. IN THE COMING MONTHS THE DEPARTMENT HOPES TO COOPERATE WITH LOCAL ISSUE-ORIENTED FOREIGN POLICY GROUPS IN SEVERAL CITIES IN ORGANIZING WORKSHOPS AT WHICH THERE WILL BE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN LOCAL CITIZENS AND DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS. OUR IMPRESSION, FROM OUR VISITS TO THE HEARTLAND IN RECENT MONTHS, IS THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS SOBERED BY OUR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 28 STATE 246296

FOREIGN POLICY SETBACKS OF RECENT YEARS AND PREOCCUPIED WITH DOMESTIC ISSUES, BUT NEVERTHELESS PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN ACTIVE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL POSTURE WHEN THEY CAN BE SHOWN THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN INTERESTS AND VALUES.

31. THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS (UNDERSCORED)

THE CONGRESS HAS A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY IN FOREIGN POLICY. FOR AN OFFICIAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO ACCEPT THIS POSITION IS SOMETHING LIKE ACCEPTING THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNIVERSE. IT IS A FACT THAT THROUGH MUCH OF THE POST-WAR AND COLD-WAR PERIOD, AND INDEED MOST OF THE VIET-NAM



WAR, THE CONGRESS CHOSE TO SUPPORT THE EXECUTIVE AND NOT  
TO EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES, A POSITION  
WHICH I BELIEVE REFLECTED THAT OF THE NATION. ON THE  
OTHER HAND IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THE PRESENT CONGRESS  
IS DETERMINED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY.  
SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION STILL BELIEVES IT HAS A ROLE,  
CERTAIN CLASHES WOULD BE INEVITABLE EVEN IF THE EXECUTIVE  
AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES WERE NOT CONTROLLED BY OPPOSING  
PARTIES. HOWEVER UNCOMFORTABLE, THIS IS AS THE FOUNDING  
FATHERS INTENDED IT. CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLAR EDWARD  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 29 STATE 246296

CORWIN WROTE:

QUOTE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES, AND ALL THAT IT DOES,  
IS TO CONFER UPON THE PRESIDENT CERTAIN POWERS CAPABLE  
OF AFFECTING OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND CERTAIN OTHER  
POWERS OF THE SAME GENERAL NATURE UPON THE SENATE, AND  
STILL OTHER POWERS UPON CONGRESS; BUT WHICH OF THESE  
ORGANS SHALL HAVE THE DECISIVE AND FINAL VOICE IN  
DETERMINING THE COURSE OF THE AMERICAN NATION IS LEFT  
FOR EVENTS TO RESOLVE. UNQUOTE

32. HENRY KISSINGER, WHO IS SOMETHING OF A SCHOLAR IN  
HIS OWN RIGHT, HAS SUGGESTED THAT LEGISLATIVE BRANCH  
SHOULD HANDLE TACTICS. THIS MAKES A GOOD DEAL OF SENSE  
TO ME AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY THERE IS  
AS YET NO CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECU-  
-  
TIVE ON WHICH IS WHICH.  
33. EVERYONE AGREES THAT THERE MUST BE MORE AND BETTER  
CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE TWO BRANCHES SO THAT THEY CAN  
EACH CARRY OUT THEIR DUTIES MORE EFFECTIVELY. MY JOB IS

CONCERNED WITH A PIECE OF THAT, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE CONGRESS, AND I MUST SAY IT  
IS VERY COMPLICATED. THE SHIFTS OF POWER FROM THE LEADER-  
SHIP TO THE BACKBENCHERS IN CONGRESS MEANS THAT THERE ARE  
MORE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO WANT TO BE DIRECTLY CONSULTED.  
BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC ISSUES,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 30 STATE 246296

MANY ADDITIONAL COMMITTEES AND SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE  
CONGRESS ARE INTERESTED IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS, AND  
MOST OF THEM WANT SECRETARY KISSINGER HIMSELF TO TESTIFY  
BEFORE THEM, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A FEW OTHER PEOPLE IN  
THE DEPARTMENT WHO KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY.  
THE SECRETARY SPENDS ABOUT A QUARTER OF HIS TIME DEALING  
WITH THE CONGRESS -- PERHAPS MORE TIME SHUTTling BETWEEN  
THE DEPARTMENT AND THE HILL THAN BETWEEN CAIRO AND TEL  
AVIV.

34. I HAVE MADE VARIOUS EFFORTS SINCE TAKING ON THIS  
JOB TO BROADEN AND DEEPEN CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE  
DEPARTMENT AND THE HILL. I AM TRYING TO INVOLVE MORE  
PEOPLE IN THE DEPARTMENT IN GOING UP TO TALK TO MEMBERS  
OF CONGRESS AND THEIR STAFFS. WE HAVE BEEFED UP THE  
DEBRIEFINGS OF CONGRESSIONAL AND STAFF DELEGATIONS AFTER  
THEY RETURN FROM OVERSEAS OFFICIAL VISITS. AND WE ARE  
THINKING OF LETTING CONGRESSIONAL STAFF PEOPLE SIT IN ON  
THE PREPARATION OF THE COUNTRY ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY

PAPERS FOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHICH WE PREPARE

ANNUALLY AT THE DEPARTMENT.

35. I MENTIONED EARLIER THE INEVITABILITY OF CLASHES  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 31 STATE 246296

BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE, AND I DO NOT WANT  
TO IMPLY FOR A MOMENT THAT MY EFFORTS TO GET THE HILL AND  
THE DEPARTMENT TOGETHER, AND MY OWN OIL-CAN-IS-MIGHTIER-  
THAN-THE-SWORD APPROACH TO CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, HAVE  
BLOWN AWAY THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARTISAN CLASHES. I  
HAVE TO MENTION CERTAIN AREAS IN WHICH THE EXECUTIVE,  
WHILE RESPECTING THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS, HAS TO PRE-  
SERVE ITS ABILITY TO PLAY ITS OWN ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY.  
THE FIRST OF THESE IS IN THE AREA OF PROTECTION OF CLASSI-  
FIED MATERIAL. IN RECENT MONTHS THE ADMINISTRATION HAS  
PROVIDED AN HITHERTO UNPRECEDENTED AMOUNT OF CLASSIFIED  
INFORMATION TO VARIOUS COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS ON SUCH  
MATTERS AS INTELLIGENCE AND THE SINAI ACCORDS. SOME  
COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN PROTECTING THIS  
MATERIAL FROM LEAKING, OBTAINING THE CONCURRENCE OF THE  
ADMINISTRATION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING IT; OTHERS, LESS SO.  
WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ABUSES IN CLASSIFICATION,  
AND THAT MUCH MATERIAL WHICH HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED MAY  
BECOME DECLASSIFIABLE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS STILL A  
REQUIREMENT, RECOGNIZED EVEN IN THE FREEDOM OF INFORMA-  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 32 STATE 246296

TION ACT AMENDMENTS WHICH THE CONGRESS PASSED LAST YEAR, THAT INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE, REVEALING SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS, OR IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE PROVIDED POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, MUST BE PROTECTED IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE OVERALL VIABILITY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY MAKING PROCESS.

36. WITH RESPECT TO THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALLY ATTRIBUTABLE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, THE SECRETARY HAS REFUSED A SUBPOENA FROM THE CONGRESS TO PROVIDE A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFY A CAREER OFFICER.

WE CONSIDER THAT TWO IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES ARE INVOLVED HERE; THE FIRST IS THE PRINCIPLE OF EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH MEANS THAT POLICY-LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE RESPONSIBLE BEFORE THE CONGRESS FOR DISCUSSING AND EXPLAINING THEIR POLICY DECISIONS AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS THEY RECEIVED; THE SECOND IS THE PRINCIPLE OF PROTECTING CAREER LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM EX POST FACTO SCRUTINY OF THEIR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE CONGRESS OR THE PUBLIC, IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THESE OFFICIALS TO MAKE CANDID AND OBJECTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS TAILORED TO THE NEEDS - OF FOREIGN POLICY AND NOT TO THEIR POSSIBLE POPULARITY ON LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 33 STATE 246296

THE HILL OR AMONG THE PUBLIC. NO DOUBT THIS ISSUE WILL BE

SETTLED BY THE COURTS.

37. CONCLUSION (UNDERScoreD)

I TRUST THAT IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT I HAVE SAID THAT I  
BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE A GOOD START IN ADAPTING OUR  
FOREIGN POLICY TO THE CHANGES IN THE WORLD SINCE THE COLD  
WAR ERA, AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE FIRST YEARS OF OUR  
THIRD CENTURY. I AM SURE THAT THERE IS A BROAD DESIRE  
AMONG THE PUBLIC AND THE CONGRESS TO MOVE TOWARD THE MORE  
SECURE, PROSPEROUS, FREE, AND JUST WORLD THAT I DESCRIBED  
IN ADMITTEDLY GENERAL TERMS. I THINK IT IS CLEAR THAT  
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE CONGRESS HAVE A VITAL ROLE TO  
PLAY IN DEVELOPING AND SUPPORTING POLICIES THAT WOULD  
MOVE US TOWARD THAT KING OF FUTURE. EVEN THE EXECUTIVE  
BRANCH HAS A ROLE TO PLAY. END TEXT.

38. THE FOREGOING DRAFT HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH ANYONE  
AND LARS HYDLE THINKS IT IS PROBABLY SOMEWHAT LONG. KISSINGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 16 OCT 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CunninFX  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE246296  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** LHYDLE  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750359-0791  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751050/aaaabsygy.tel  
**Line Count:** 1551  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SP  
**Original Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 29  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 11 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <11 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <17 OCT 2003 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MCCLOSKEY - DRAFT SPEECH  
**TAGS:** OVIP, (MCCLOSKEY)  
**To:** MADRID  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006